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Abstract
An explanation for the political processes leading to the sudden collapse
of empires and states would be useful for understanding both historical and
contemporary political events. We seek a general description of state col-
lapse spanning eras and cultures, from small kingdoms to continental em-
pires, drawing on a suitably diverse range of historical sources. Our aim
is to provide an accessible verbal hypothesis that bridges the gap between
mathematical and social methodology. We use game-theory to determine
whether factions within a state will accept the political status quo, or wish
to better their circumstances through costly rebellion. In lieu of precise data
we verify our model using sensitivity analysis. We find that a small amount
of dissatisfaction is typically harmless, but can trigger sudden collapse when
there is a sufficient buildup of political inequality. Contrary to intuition, a
state is predicted to be least stable when its leadership is at the height of
its political power and thus most able to exert its influence through external
warfare, lavish expense or autocratic decree.
1 Cycles and collapses in history
History has witnessed the rise and fall of countless empires, dynasties and regimes.
What governs these apparently inevitable processes has been discussed across the
eras Breisach (2007). Whilst growth and power seem naturally self-reinforcing,
reversal into decline or collapse has impacted every state and culture not present
today. Further, the fate of a nation is often tied closely to the fate of its leading
class; the sudden collapse of one usually leads to a similar collapse of the other
Boyle (1968); Scales (1993).
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Within a state, influence and power are often distributed unequally. Political
change is affected by many factors including visible achievements and failures,
deliberate manipulation, accidents of fate and external forces. Historically, stable
political states can enjoy long periods of relative growth and internal stability
during which the leading class can gain a larger and larger share of the wealth and
resource Gibbon (1776); Scullard (2010). However, the process of mounting
inequality has clearly not continued forever.
Power may also change rapidly, and with great impact on the fate of apparently
stable states. Whilst we do not apply our model to contemporary conflict, the
clarity provided by modern media during the Arab Spring of 2011 Johnstone
and Mazo (2011); Campante and Chor (2012) illustrates the lack of simplicity
in these transitions. In many cases, rebellion operated without a unified name or
organisation long before any form of leadership emerged (for example, in Libya
Gause III (2011)), signifying a decentralised process.
We are interested in why social disorder appears rapidly from an apparently
stable state. Is there a generality describing when dissident movements will receive
support and when they will be ignored? Actual success of rebellion movements
means acquiring military power, which is strongly dependent on technology and
social structure. Those with the military power may join the rebellion if it is in
their interests to do so. During peace this may seem implausible, but the toll of
rebellion may rapidly change the situation.
Collapse events have been linked to environmental factors such as local or
global climate change Cullen et al. (2000); Weiss and Bradley (2001); Zhang
et al. (2007); Buckley et al. (2010); Dugmore et al. (2012) and long term
degradation of resource Diamond (2005) (although there is still controversy, e.g.
Marohasy (2005)). However, the environment alone is unlikely to provide a
general explanation for collapse. Disturbance does not affect all societies equally;
for example, Sassanid Persia thrived during periods in which the neighbouring
Roman empire experienced agricultural decline McCormick et al. (2012). Many
collapse events occur in the absence of environmental pressure Butzer (2012),
with external conquest, internal conflict, or poor social, political and economic
institutions playing a greater role instead. Our model describes the dynamical
process behind the social conditions that make unrest more likely in the presence
of external stresses.
Our model is complementary to other theories of collapse Tainter (1990) by
providing a game-theory or economic explanation for social assumptions. Collins
Collins (1978, 1986) emphasises the importance of areas at the fringe of empires,
so called ‘marchlands’, which tend to be the incubators of new regimes or polities.
The thirteenth century author Ibn Khaldun Khaldun (1958) describes a concept
he calls ‘asabiya’ or ‘group feeling’ in which loyalties are nested within a state.
The metaethnic frontier theory of Turchin (Turchin, 2003a, p.50-77) combines
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these hypotheses. As we predict that power equality can lead to stability, the
most cohesive states should emerge from marchlands and tight-knit groups with
high asibiya.
We join a recent trend of providing mathematical models for historical hy-
potheses (some excellent examples are (Turchin, 2003b; Knappett et al., 2008;
Currie et al., 2010; Baggaley et al., 2012)). Whilst some general principles of
civil conflict and disunity are understood Aghion and Williamson (1998); Col-
lier et al. (2000) without the need for modelling, mathematics provides formal
reasoning that aids in generalisation. A mathematical theory of collapse is a first
step towards a statistically sound, data-driven comparison between hypotheses (a
feat we do not attempt here). Our model is too general to be the full explana-
tion for any specific scenario, so we consider a wide range of documented collapse
events that contain qualitative similarities without claims about the important
factors in any given situation. Conceptually the model is qualitative and robustly
explored by considering numerous precise instantiations, which acts as a sensi-
tivity analysis Saltelli et al. (2000) helpful for supporting (but not confirming)
conclusions from non-quantitative data.
2 A qualitative model of collapse
Consider a number of actors playing a repeated public goods game, in which
cooperators enter their resource into a public pool to be redistributed according
to influence, which changes over time. Defectors obtain lower mean payoff but are
not subject to redistribution. The game dynamics (Fig. 1) draw on three vital
qualitative assumptions:
1. Inequality of influence and hence resource will increase (on average) over
time when actors cooperate.
2. Defecting produces an overall cost, reducing resource for the defector and
reducing the public goods for the cooperators.
3. Defecting decreases the future influence inequality.
Cooperating means obeying the rules of a political system designed to prevent
costly conflict between the actors. Within the system, political influence tends to
accumulate with those that have the most resource, leading to increasing inequal-
ity. By ‘defecting’ from the political system, actors pay a cost but increase their
political standing.
We investigate how these assumptions lead to coordinated activity such that
actors cooperate periodically, and defect en-masse. This dynamic may provide
an explanation for the long-term difficulties experienced by many co-operation
systems, including the disintegration of powerful nation-states and empires over
the course of history.
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Figure 1: Qualitative model. Factions (a) decide whether to cooperate or defect.
Then (b) raw resource is collected, which (c) is either reduced (for defectors) or
redistributed according to power (for cooperators). Power grows (d) according to
resource, with a defection bonus, and (e) is normalised. This effectively reduces
power for some and increases it for others, potentially changing their behaviour
next round.
3 Qualitative trends in history
In this section we outline some examples of qualitative features that are consistent
with our model.
3.1 The ubiquity of collapse
The phenomenon of collapse has occurred across diverse world cultures throughout
history, and has affected polities of all sizes. Here we describe cases where a state
able to exert significant power has experienced collapse or unrest. Such states
have strong leadership relative to their subjects, evidenced by a) the successful
imposition of will, or b) the ability to expend resource in prolonged offensive wars,
extensive building programs, etc.
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The reign of Amenhotep IV (Akhenaton) of Egypt is an excellent example
of unrest stemming from centralised power, demonstrated by autocratic decree
and lavish expense (Bury et al., 1924, p.204-205). He decorated his capital and
empire with sun temples and other paraphanalia of a new religion, which led to
unrest and internal disorganisation (Bury et al., 1924, p.207).
The early reign of the Achaemenid Persian emperor Xerxes, following that of
his father Darius, was beset by internal rebellion in Babylonia and Egypt. Darius’
reign involved extensive military activity, and while Xerxes was eventually able
to return to the offensive, his reign was necessarily more passive and defensive
(Boardman et al., 1988, p.78).
The division of Alexander the Great’s empire can be thought of as a collapse, as
it resulted in violent upheaval (Waterfield, 2011, p30-69),(Bickerman, 1983,
p3). The successor states or Diadochi engaged in extensive warfare over the
following decades, and many subdivided further (Bickerman, 1983, p7).
Many examples can be taken from the late Roman republic; the Social (or Mar-
sic) War (Scullard, 2010, p.68-70), as well as three Servile Wars (Scullard,
2010, p.95-96) were fought by Rome during or immediately after periods of ex-
pansion abroad. The stated grievance in these cases was explicitly inequality; the
slaves wished to be elevated from their abject position in society, whilst the Socii
demanded an end to their second-class status within the Republic. Caesar’s civil
war (Caesar, 1997, p. xxvii-xxx) also took place immediately after a period of of-
fensive foreign campaigns, notably the annexation of Gaul. Caesar also explicitly
touted the grievance of inequitable distribution of wealth and power (Caesar,
1997, p.76-77).
The reign of the Roman emperor Domitian was lambasted by writers of his
time as being tyrannical and autocratic von Fritz (1957). Contemporary de-
tractors claimed that he ignored tradition, executed senators who opposed him
and openly asserted primacy over the senate (Jones, 1992, p.193-198). After his
assassination, the new emperor Nerva had a short and impotent tenure, due to
revolts by the military. The indulgence and autocracy of the Roman emperor
Commodus (Grant, 1996, p.64-79) is often described as the beginning of the
decline of the Roman empire Gibbon (1776), leading to a protracted civil war.
Yet the Nerva-Antonine dynasty that preceded Commodus was amongst the most
successful periods in Roman history. The remnants of the Roman empire, centred
on Byzantium, exhibited periodic instability well into the Middle Ages (Auze´py,
2008, p258-259).
Immediately after the adoption of Islam, Arab armies expanded their domain
westwards towards Morocco, east into Persia and as far north as France. The
empire collapsed in the mid-8th century, and the successor states suffered further
internal conflict and dissolution in the following centuries (Scales, 1993, p1-10).
The Angkor or Khmer civilisation of Indochina experienced sharp episodes
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of civil war, notably prior to the accession of Suryavarman I (Coe, 2003, p112).
Angkor provides an excellent example of a state whose power rested on appro-
priation from vassals; indeed, much of Jayavarman II’s power depended on a rice
surplus (Higham, 2004, p89-90).
Richard I of England undertook extensive conflict in France and the Levant.
His reign was followed by that of John I, in which concessions were made to the
nobility in response to mounting unrest Hollister (1961).
In the wake of their initial conquests, the Mongol empire divided, at times
violently, into smaller, culturally heterogeneous polities (Boyle, 1968, p340-355).
The 1905 Ascher (1988) and February 1917 Polunov (2005) revolutions in
Russia are often attributed to the inequitable distribution of wealth and power1
between the ruling classes and the majority of the population Trotsky and
Bostock (1972).
3.2 Trends to conglomeration
Although there are counter-examples, the tendency towards conglomeration is
relatively ubiquitous. We note the latifundia of ancient Rome Gibbon (1776),
the extensive provincial landholdings of the late Sassanid empire Eisenstadt
(1964), and Feudal Europe Blaydes and Chaney (2013). Mercantile quasi-
states such as the Hanseatic League (Dollinger, 1964, p186), Italian merchant
republics (Hunt, 1994, p212-229) and European colonial enterprises (Gardner,
1971, p250-254) also exhibit this behaviour.
3.3 Cascading civil unrest
Uncoordinated defections often produce their own momentum; as more factions
choose to leave a state, they impact upon the perceived legitimacy of that state
and encourage further defections. Several previous examples exhibit this be-
haviour Waterfield (2011); Bickerman (1983); Auze´py (2008); Laiou (2008);
Herrin (2007); Gregory (2005); Treadgold (1997).
3.4 Revolt through desperation
A common instigator of internal conflict is the inability of a faction to hold political
power or influence by peaceful means. This occurs when a faction perceives that
it receives an inadequate degree of power, or that it’s power is being eroded. The
perception of inequity may encourage the use of violence in order to redress the
apparent imbalance. Excellent examples of this appear in the late Republican
period of Rome (Dillon and Garland, 2005, p.405-446,505-543,619-674) ; of
particular note is the career of Catiline (Durant, 1944, p.142) . The repeated,
1The term ‘autocrat’ was part of the official title of the Tsars.
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and often unsuccessful, peasant revolts of medieval Europe also exhibit many of
these features Bernard (1964).
4 Basic Model: state formation and collapse
The model takes the form of an iterated multiplayer game. Consider N au-
tonomous factions (i.e. actors), who may be individuals or groups with similar
enough motivations to act coherently, competing via the model in Figure 1 (de-
fined precisely in Methods). Each faction starts with an equal amount of raw
resource and chooses to defect or cooperate in order to obtain the highest net re-
source, assuming that other factions do not change their decisions. Net resource
depends on all factions’ actions and power. Power is then updated2 based on
the resources obtained and the decisions made, increasing most when defecting or
when a large amount of resource is obtained. The process is then repeated using
the new distribution of power and decisions.
The model produces periods of widespread cooperation and collapse, as shown
in Fig. 2. During state formation, the power of non-leader factions equalises
around the point at which cooperation becomes viable. Once cooperation is es-
tablished, defection occasionally occurs in isolation as redistributed resource falls
below a threshold. Rarely, but periodically, enough factions are sufficiently weak
so that the defection of the preceding faction changes their own best choice, lead-
ing to a defection cascade. Once the political landscape has equalised sufficiently,
a corresponding cooperation cascade occurs nearly as rapidly. Cooperation and
defection periods occur with a predictable timescale leading to ‘spontaneous’ pe-
riodic behaviour.
How reliable is the model? It has four parameters: the number of factions
N , time discretisation µ, defection resource penalty w, and defection power gain
ρ. Fig. 3a-d highlights the parameter regions for which the model behaves as
Fig. 2. Although N has many important effects (Section S1), all values of N >
2 match the qualitative model. Similarly, all theoretically valid values of the
defection penalty w also match (Section S1.3). Small timesteps µ < 0.05 act as a
timescale, but large µ or rebellion effectiveness ρ prevents periodic behaviour due
to ‘intrinsic’ noise from the discretisation of time (see below).
4.1 Features of the Basic Model
We can take the continuous time limit of our model, which removes intrinsic noise
due to discretisation. We can also take the continuous faction limit, which leads to
a Partial Differential Equation model. These models (Section S1) are not readily
solvable but do allow us to understand why our model behaves as it does.
2Power is treated a zero-sum game, although this is a simplification of reality Baldwin (1979).
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Figure 2: Characteristic behaviour of our model. a) Defection behaviour with
state formation and collapse. Defection is shown in grey, cooperation in white,
and the leading faction in black (which always cooperates). b) The power of
factions over time. c) The resource of factions over time. The power and resource
of the non-leader factions converge, with the result that periodic coordination and
defection periods occur. (Parameters: ρ = 0.2, w = 0.02, N = 11 and µ = 0.01.)
During cooperation, power departs exponentially from R0. Defection occurs
because:
1. A defection always makes cooperators worse off;
2. Later defections have a greater impact than early defections, making a cas-
cade more likely as more factions defect;
3. Failed defection cascades erode the power of weaker non-defecting factions
most, helping future cascades to succeed.
The dynamics follow 4 distinct phases that repeat in a cycle:
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Figure 3: Effect of parameters/model extensions on the qualitative dynamics. The
plots are shaded to show whether model qualitatively behaves as Figure 2. The
model either matches (solid), deviates (dense hatching) or fails (thin shading).
The qualitative fit is based on quantitative scores (see Methods). Firstly, ‘State
formation’ (Sf ) is high when states are large and collapse rapidly to few factions.
Secondly, ‘Periodicity’ (Sp) is high if there is periodic predictability to decisions.
Thirdly, ‘State size’ (Ss) is high if state formation and collapse affect all factions.
Finally, ‘Capital stability’ (Sc) is high if the leading faction does not change from
the initial leader (relevant only for plots e–h). The qualitative model is matched
if Sf > 0.5, Sp > 0.05, Ss = 1 and Sc = 1. It deviates if Sp < 0.05, Ss = 0.5 or
Sc = 0. Otherwise the qualitative model fails. Also shown (where possible) is the
parameter value from Fig. 2 (vertical line).
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1. Cooperation: Power becomes concentrated in the leading factions. Weaker
factions may defect in an uncoordinated manner.
2. Collapse: Defectors coordinate into a cascade when the cumulative power
distribution is everywhere above a threshold.
3. Defection: Defection continues until power becomes sufficiently diffuse to
permit cooperation. The strongest factions may cooperate first in failed
state formation attempts.
4. Recovery: A cooperation cascade occurs in much the same way as the defec-
tion cascade, when the cumulative power distribution is everywhere below
a (complex) threshold.
Additionally, we obtain a bound on the duration of cooperation and defection
periods by allowing all non-leading factions to behave identically. In this case we
can obtain closed-form expressions for the duration of cooperation and defection
phases. The initial conditions can be very important in determining how close
the bound is, from which we conjecture that this model has no general analytic
solution, although bounds can be found and special cases solved.
5 Extensions: A model sensitivity analysis
When performing parameter inference using quantitative data, a minimum re-
quirement is to assess how robustly the parameters are inferred via a sensitivity
analysis Saltelli et al. (2000). Here we are instead trying to infer that some
qualitative features were created by a general class of model. We attempt to
understand the qualitative model space using a model-level sensitivity analysis.
5.1 Unequal resource distribution
Resource is distributed unevenly in practice, which we model by replacing R0
with R0i ∝ exp(κi) for faction i. κ > 0 means that initially powerful factions have
less resource. Fig. 3e shows that a resource-weak leader can either persist or be
usurped. Periodicity and collapse events persist, and further, Section S2.1 and
Fig. S1 show that a resource-weak leader results in reduced average conflict.
5.2 Uncertain outcomes
The political power process is contingent on events outside of complete control
of faction leaders. We model this by adding noise (normal, with mean σp; see
Section S2.1) to the obtained power change before normalisation. Fig. 3f shows
that small levels of noise do not effect the qualitative behaviour. Moderate levels
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lead to a leader turnover and loss of periodicity, whilst high levels prevent both
coordination of both state formation and collapse (Fig. S2).
5.3 Biased decision making and random choices
People are not naive resource optimisers. Decisions may be biased, hard to change,
poorly calculated, made with respect to longer term goals, or otherwise unobserved
features.
Complex decisions can be allowed for by introducing a random function ηi(t)
for the decision threshold of each faction. We include ‘persistence’ via a bias β
towards the previous action, and random fluctuations in whether to favour de-
fection or cooperation via a Gaussian Process Rasmussen and Williams (2006)
(Section S2.3). This is determined by two parameters: the magnitude of the fluc-
tuations σ and their correlation over time τ . To interpret τ , factions are effectively
making ‘new random decisions’ every O(τ) time units. If τ  1, then decisions
appear ‘noisy’, and if τ is very large, each faction will appear (randomly) biased.
Fig. 3g and Fig. S3 show that a range of β has no qualitative effect, whilst
moderate values lead to leader turnover and a lack of periodicity. Fig. 3h-i
demonstrate that small to moderate levels of noise (Fig. S4) don’t effect the
dynamics, and further, when decisions are more correlated in time (Fig. S5) then
state formation is more stable to high decision noise. This happens because power
has time to equilibrate around the random choice of decision boundary.
5.4 Spatial structure
Some political scenarios are best described with a spatial model. For example,
factions may be local leaders of villages, or semi-autonomous regions of a larger
state. We replace w by wi = w
∗ exp (−|xi − xC |wd/N) (Section S2.4), i.e. both
the resource penalty for defection, and the political gains from doing so, decay
with distance from the capital (leading faction). The average E(wi) = w, i.e. is
unchanged, and distance is calculated on a ring (so factions 1 and N are neigh-
bours).
The spatial model (Fig. 3j) allows for a variety of different scenarios. The
state grows from the capital (Fig. S6) and collapses as in the non-spatial model.
Collapse may be from the outside in, or the inside out. There may be a well
defined maximum spatial extent (hatched region of Fig. 3j).
5.5 Modified intrinsic noise
We chose to define Model 1 as an iterated game, which has consequences for the
way that noise enters the system. Although the basic model is deterministic, the
discretisation of time can produce ‘chaotic’ dynamics (e.g. large µ in Figure 3b) as
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small variations in the value of political power have large effects. Is this ‘intrinsic
noise’ important for the dynamics?
To address this issue we constructed a modified version of the model in which
only a single faction makes a decision at a time (using the Gillespie Algorithm
Gillespie (1977)) with an average timestep of µ/N (Section S2.5). Fig. S7
compares this model with the basic model and shows that there is no qualita-
tive change. Additionally, the continuous time version of the model (Section S1)
matches the qualitative data. We view these issues as ‘modelling degrees of free-
dom’ and only consider model behaviours that are present for all choices.
5.6 Non-uniform defection penalty
If the penalty for defection decreases with the number of defectors, both defection
during cooperation and cooperation during defection are harder. This makes the
phenomenon of periodic collapse more likely to occur, as we show numerically
(Section S2.6 and Fig. S8). Leader replacement is also easier in the presence of
intrinsic (or extrinsic) noise.
5.7 Non-linear relationship between power and resource
Power and resource are simply related in our model. However, we find that a fam-
ily of non-linear functions do not effect the qualitative dynamics (Section S2.7).
Since we can map resource levels to a decision boundary in the power distribu-
tion, we conjecture that most ‘reasonable’ increasing functions will demonstrate
collapse.
6 Game Theory perspective
We have not permitted factions to consider politics when making decisions. Do
societies still collapse when longer term strategies can be employed? A little
game-theory analysis shows that the main phenomena persist, and further, that
the game has interesting behaviours of its own.
The resource payoff in our model takes the form of a simple iterated (mul-
tiplayer) game. Consider the case where there are two factions, i and j (with
pj > 1/2 > pi and pi + pj = 1) having payoff structure:
Payoff for i | j j defects j cooperates
idefects 1/2− w 1/2− w 1/2− w 1/2
i cooperates 1/2 1/2− w pi pj
Until now we have assumed that factions are simple resource maximisers. What-
ever i does, j always obtains more resource from cooperation. Since i knows
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this it should cooperate only if pi > 1/2 − w. In this circumstance pi increases
when i defects, and decreases when it cooperates. In Model 1a where decisions
are continuous, i changes action around the decision boundary and obtains payoff
1/2− w whether cooperating or defecting.
However, i could attempt to maximise its payoff over all time. There is no
reason for i not to defect for the power benefit, since only the defection payoff is
obtained on average. If i were to defect until power is equalised, then it would
enjoy a long period of high resource until power became uneven again. The payoff
from becoming the leading faction is even higher.
Should i agree to cooperate if pi < pj? If not, and j uses the same reasoning,
then both players will on average get the ‘greedy’ payoff rg = 1/2−w/2 (as they
have to defect half of the time). If either were willing to take the lower cooperation
payoff they would get more over time. Proposition 1 shows that there is a strategy
which maximises the long-term resource payoff:
Proposition 1 For Model 1a (the continuous time model), there exists a defec-
tion strategy defined by a power lower bound pmin = pmax − a for a given upper
bound pmax ≤ 1/2 − δ with a > δ > 0, which when both players use it the re-
source obtained is r∗high(a, δ) > r
∗
low(a, δ) > rg for the stronger and weaker players
respectively. (For proof, see Methods).
The existence of this longer term strategy leads to an interesting extension.
We now allow i and j to use two potential strategies in a long-term meta-game,
which both dominate the short term strategies. Passive players use the strategy
from Proposition 1, and aggressive players cooperate only as the dominant faction.
We consider the payoff averaged over many periodic cycles, assuming that during
each state formation the player with the initially higher power is chosen randomly.
Therefore a passive player always ends up with lower power than an aggressive
player, two aggressive players obtain the ‘greedy’ payoff rg, and two passive players
share leadership over time. The average payoff matrix is:
Payoff for i | j j aggressive j passive
i aggressive rg rg r
∗
high r
∗
low
ipassive r∗low r
∗
high
r∗high+r
∗
low
2
r∗high+r
∗
low
2
As rg < r
∗
low < r
∗
high, this is a form of the prisoners’ dilemma. We note an
analogy of the ‘passive’ strategy with democratic parties sharing power over time,
as opposed to corrupt or autocratic systems in which this is impossible.
The case of three or more factions can be understood analogously. Optimally,
weaker factions will act together to remove power from the leader, and such co-
ordination follows naturally from the ‘passive’ strategy. Consider that factions
cannot solve for the optimal thresholds ai but can choose them empirically. Co-
operation first occurs when all factions have equal power (to within δ). Each
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defection now occurs at the factions’ chosen threshold. As in the simple model,
defections reduce cooperators’ resource leading to defection cascades. Aggressive
factions still do not cooperate unless they are the leader and will not take part in
the state. We therefore conjecture that any number of short-term resource max-
imisers, and/or ‘passive’ long-term strategists, can form states that experience
dramatic collapse events.
7 Discussion
Proper empirical validation requires a wide and unbiased range of data sources.
Unfortunately, historical data has not been curated into a quantitative form en-
masse as evidence is patchy and inherently qualitative. We hope recent efforts
towards quantification Turchin et al. (2012) will allow our model and others
to be subjected to trial by data. Until then, all general models have been se-
lectively and qualitatively validated and are simply plausible explanations for
collapse events. More positively, many of the models mentioned above share our
qualitative assumptions and could cite the same historical case studies in their
defence.
Collapse is inevitable in our model but real states may use unmodelled options.
For example, they can attempt to eliminate rebelling factions before the collapse
cascade begins, or maintain an equitable resource distribution by deliberately
limiting their own power. The efficacy of such strategies is not considered here.
Conflict is considered only as a reduction of resource in our model and so force
is only used to impose sanctions. This may seem unrealistic when many civil wars
are put down violently. Whilst we might consider that the elimination of defect-
ing factions could create new dissatisfaction, this has not been modelled. Our
hypotheses as described best represent political systems that dissuade escalating
warfare. Historical examples are coalitions of city states (e.g. Ancient Greece),
or feudal lords (within a medieval European country), who have strong cultural
bonds and may have previously existed within a larger state.
We have made a significant effort to legitimatise the use of a utility function
for faction behaviour, by incorporating random time varying functions into the
decision process. Many factors influence decision making, from alternative goals to
incomplete knowledge, without a need to address whether the choices are rational.
The qualitative assumption here is that the resource difference between defection
and cooperation will correlate with the choice a faction makes.
A final, but vitally important point is that our model (like all models of
complex systems) may be incorrect in specific details and incomplete in general.
Such quantification of hypotheses is still helpful as it makes it possible in principle
to draw statistical comparisons between explanations for collapse. We remain
hopeful that their relative contributions can be scientifically assessed to further
14
our understanding of political history.
Materials and Methods
7.1 Mathematical Model
The decision to defect Di(t+1) = 1 if ηi(t+1) < 0 and Di(t+1) = 0 (cooperation)
otherwise, where:
ηi(t+ 1) = Ri(t+ 1|Di = 0,D−i)−Ri(t+ 1|Di = 1,D−i), (1)
and Ri(t + 1|Di) is the predicted resource obtained by action Di (assuming all
other factions do not change). Cooperators pool and redistribute resource, Ri(t+
1|Di = 0) = R0CPi(t)/PC(t), where R0C =
∑
j:Dj=0
R0j and PC(t) =
∑
j:Dj=0
Pj(t).
Defectors retain resource with a penalty, Ri(t + 1|Di = 1) = R0i − w. Power
changes according to
∆Pi(t|Di = 0) = ∆t [µRi(t)−N (t)]
∆Pi(t|Di = 1) = ∆t [µ (Ri(t) + ρw)−N (t)] , (2)
where N is a normalising constant to ensure ∑i ∆Pi(t) = 1. In the basic model
R0i = 1/N . Power is initialised by giving each faction half the power of the
previous one.
7.2 Qualitative Indicators
Section S3 and Fig. 3 interpret these scores. The ‘State formation’ score Sf =
2(Q1 + Q4) where Qi is the proportion of timesteps where the number of co-
operators C(t) is in the i-th quartile. The ‘Periodicity’ score uses p(t) = (T −
t)−1
∑T−t
t′=1 p[C(t
′ + t) = C(t′)] to form Sp = p(τ) − [p(τ/2) + p(3τ/2)]/2 where
τ = arg maxt:t≥tmin p(t), T is the total number of timesteps, and tmin excludes
the first mode. The ‘State size’ score Ss = 1 if ranget(C(t)) = [1, N ], Ss = 0.5
if mint(C(t)) = 1 and Ss = 0 otherwise. The ‘Capital stability’ score Sc = 1 if
arg maxi(Pi(t)) = 1 for all t.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Power during cooperation follows:
dPi(t|D = 1)
dt
= µ
(
Pi − 1
2
)
=⇒ Pi(t) = 1
2
− δ exp(µt)
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starting at t = 0. The time taken to reach pmin is tc = (1/µ) log(1 + a/δ). The
resource obtained per unit time in the cooperation state is Pi(t). Therefore the
total resource obtained is:
RTc =
∫ tc
0
Ri(t|Di = 0)dt = 1
µ
[
1
2
log (1 + a/δ)− a
]
.
During the defection phase, resource is obtained at rate 1/2−w and power accrued
at rate (µ/N)wo(ρ−1), so the defection duration td = aN/[µ(ρ−1)] and therefore
RTd =
∫ td
0 Ri(t|Di = 1)dt = a(1/2 − w). The average rate of resource acquisition
is
ri(a) =
RTc +R
T
d
tc + td
=
1
2 log
(
1 + aδ
)− a(1− µ2 )− wµ
log
(
1 + aδ
)
+ aNρ−1
(3)
This can be solved for a = a∗ giving a maximum resource r∗low when the resource
rate dr(a)da = 0. Although there is no explicit form, the maxima exists at positive
a and is non-trivial (i.e. not a boundary). During this time, the leading faction
obtains a higher payoff during the cooperation phase RTj = R
T
i + 2(δ+a)/µ, with
a higher average rate r∗high.
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S1 Mathematical frameworks for the basic model
Model 1a removes intrinsic noise (see Section S2.5) by taking the continuous-time limit.
Instead of factions being offered a choice to defect according to a schedule, time proceeds
until the next change in decision occurs. Multiple decision changes may follow instan-
taneously if the choice of one faction affects the choice of another. In this way we can
understand ‘defection cascades’ and ‘cooperation cascades’ in which a large fraction of
the actors change their decision at once.
Model 1b allows for a continuous distribution of factions. Because there is no noise
in the system, the power ordering of factions cannot change. Therefore a single decision
boundary between cooperation and defection will always exist, which may remain constant
over time (during a cooperation or a defection phase) or move rapidly (during a cascade).
This model takes the form of a Partial Differential Equation.
Parameter Explanation
N Number of factions
R0i Raw resource available to faction i (R
0
i = 1/N in the
basic model).
w Defection ‘intensity’ controlling resource penalty and
power gain
µ Increment of time.
ρ Power gain during defection relative to w.
Table 1: Description of parameters in the basic model.
Table 1 describes the parameters of the model, which for convenience we reproduce
here. The decision to defect Di(t) = 1 if ηi(t) > 0 and Di(t) = 0 otherwise, where:
ηi(t) = Ri(t|Di = 1,D−i)−Ri(t|Di = 0,D−i). (S1)
Cooperators pool and redistribute resource, Ri(t|Di = 0) = R0CPi(t)/PC(t) (where R0C =∑
j:Dj=0
R0j and PC(t) =
∑
j:Dj=0
Pj(t)), whereas defectors retain resource with a penalty,
Ri(t|Di = 1) = R0i − w. Power changes according to
Pi(t+ 1|Di = 0) = Pi(t) + ∆t [µRi(t)−N (t)] (S2)
Pi(t+ 1|Di = 1) = Pi(t) + ∆t [µ (Ri(t) + ρw)−N (t)] ,
where N is a normalising constant to ensure ∑i ∆Pi(t) = 1. By substituting the normal-
ising factor N into Eq. S2, defining the number of cooperators C = N −∑Ni=1Di, the
basic model can be written:
∆Pi(t|Di = 0)
∆t
= µ
[
C
N
Pi(t)
S(t)
− 1
N
− N − C
N
w(ρ− 1)
]
∆Pi(t|Di = 1)
∆t
= µ
[
1
N
+ w(ρ− 1)− 1
N
− N − C
N
w(ρ− 1)
]
= µ
C
N
w(ρ− 1) (S3)
where S(t) =
∑N
i=1(1 −Di)Pi(t) is the power held by the cooperators. For convenience
we label this as Model 1.
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Model 1a: A continuous-time description of Model 1 can be obtained by taking the
limit ∆t → 0, which we will call Model 1a. The continuous time version of the model
is special, because the original power ordering can not change. This can be exploited to
obtain several theoretical results which do not exactly hold in the discrete time model,
although the general features (such as overall defection patterns) do still hold. We order
factions by their power (from high to low); now the number of cooperators C is a defection
threshold with Di = 0 for i ≤ C, Di = 1 for i > C. Therefore S(t) =
∑C
i=1 Pi(t) is the
power held by the cooperators, and additionally we can define Sx(t) =
∑x
i=1 Pi(t) as the
power held by all factions up to x. The power model becomes:
dPi(t|i ≤ C)
dt
= µ
[
C
N
Pi(t)
S(t)
− 1
N
− N − C
N
w(ρ− 1)
]
dPi(t|i > C)
dt
= µ
[
C
N
]
w(ρ− 1) (S4)
Model 1b: We will make use of a continuous distribution of factions, by taking the
continuous limit in faction space x ∈ (1, N), leading to Model 1b:
∂P (x, t|x ≤ C)
∂t
= µ
[
C
N
P (x, t)
S(x, t)
− 1
N
− N − C
N
w(ρ− 1)
]
∂P (x, t|x > C)
∂t
= µ
C
N
w(ρ− 1) (S5)
where we have defined S(x, t) =
∫ x
0
P (x, t)dx. We force C ≥ 1 to preserve the special
behaviour of the leading faction (now represented continuously by x < 1) who always
cooperates. Expressed like this the model deals with infinitesimal densities. Since S(x, t)
appears on the right hand side, it will be convenient to work with this directly and recover
faction power using P (x, t) = ∂S(x, t)/∂x. We will write S(x|t) when considering a fixed
t and S(t|x) for a fixed x; these equations are follow ODEs rather than PDEs.
Because of the dependence on the defection threshold C (which is defined in terms of
the power distribution) searching for a general solution to the ensuing PDE in Model 1b
is ambitious. However, we will be able to provide bounds to the distribution S(x, t) that
can lead to, and recover from, collapse into a defection state. From this we can bound
the time taken for defection periods.
We are interested in the behaviour of all 3 models and will use results from each in
the calculations. However, the focus is on properties of Models 1a-b that are also present
in the simulations of Model 1.
S1.1 Behaviour when all factions cooperate
When all factions cooperate, the dynamics of Model 1a are simple. Substituting D = 0
into Equation S4 gives S(t) = 1 and hence:
dPi(t)
dt
= µ
[
Pi(t)− 1
N
]
(S6)
which can be solved by separation of variables, with initial condition Pi(t = 0) = P
0
i to
give:
Pi(t) =
1
N
+
(
P 0i −
1
N
)
exp(µt) (S7)
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i.e. exponential departure from the initial deviation away from the mean initial resource
(which was 1/N). We can therefore solve for tDi , the time until faction i defects. This
occurs when Ri(t) = 1/N − w, and as additionally we have Pi(t) = Ri(t), we obtain:
tDi =
1
µ
log
(
w
P 0i − 1/N
)
(S8)
Only the minimum time (hence arg mini(P
0
i ) = P
0
N ) is relevant to the time of the first
defection event.
S1.2 Defection cascades
A defection cascade is defined by defections occurring as a direct result of other defections.
Faction N is first to defect and has PN (t) = RN (t) = 1/N −w; subsequent defectors have
greater power.
Defecting factions have resource Ri(t|Di = 1) = 1/N − w, hence the decision for
faction C to defect requires:
C
N
PC(t)∑C
j=1 Pj(t)
− 1
N
+ pw < 0 (S9)
which can be solved for the lower bound PC(t) < bC for the faction C to defect (recalling
that faction C = 1 cannot defect):
bC =
1− wN
(C − 1) + wN
C−1∑
j=1
Pj(t) (S10)
Note that bC−1 ≥ bC since Pj is not decreasing with j.
We now work with the cumulative power Si(t) =
∑i
j=1 Pj(t), and solve for the case
bC = PC(t) = ∆iSi(t) using the notation S
∗
i (t) for the cumulative power up to the
boundary. Letting PC(t) = bC acts as an effective upper bound for defection of faction
C, since it places the minimum possible power with the remaining cooperators, making
defection for one of them harder.
Recall that cooperators have small i, so S∗ is the power in the remaining cooperators;
defection of faction i will occur if the faction is too weak to remain with the other
cooperators, i.e. S∗i (t) is too large. Rearranging Equation S9 for the boundary:
S∗i+1(t)− S∗i (t) =
1− wN
i+ wN
S∗i (t) (S11)
which when considered in Model 1b leads to
dS∗(x|t)
dx
=
1− wN
x+ wN
S∗(x|t). (S12)
Note that this restricts 0 < w < 1/N . Equation S12 can be solved by separation of
variables (recalling that S(x = N |t) = 1):
S∗(x|t) =
(
x/N + w
1 + w
)1−wN
. (S13)
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Instead of differentiating S∗(x|t), which would approximate S∗i (t) via a piecewise linear
function, we will obtain the best match with Models 1 and 1a if we compute the boundary
for specific factions using differences of the cumulative power of factions:
P ∗i (t) = S
∗
i (t)− S∗i−1(t) =
(
i/N + w
1 + w
)1−wN
−
(
(i− 1)/N + w
1 + w
)1−wN
(S14)
For a defection cascade to occur in Model 1b, S(x|t) > S∗(x, t) is a strict requirement
on the distribution of power – any faction reducing the total cooperation power below
this has sufficient power to continue cooperating. A defection cascade will stop at the
first faction for which the bound does not hold. However, it is possible (and occurs in
practice) that defection cascades instantaneously reach only a large proportion of the
factions. The remaining few factions have power above the threshold, but their power
continues to reduce, so more may join the defection. If N is large, several factions may
avoid defection completely.
Defection cascades can occur instantaneously in Models 1a and 1b. For Model 1,
assuming µ is small, a defection cascade changes the resource levels by a much larger
amount than it would change under normal time evolution of the model. Therefore
cascades in Model 1 (and Model 1a) take a very similar form, differing only qualitatively.
S1.3 Duration of epochs in the cycle
Collapse (and recovery) events are triggered by the whole cumulative power distribution
falling above (below) the decision threshold. This is a complex procedure in general as
smaller defection and cooperation events affecting a few factions can occur, which can
change the shape of the resulting distribution.
We can obtain a bound on the maximum duration of cooperation and defection period.
We assume that all factions act at the same time, do not defect independently during the
cooperation phase, and do not cooperate independently during the defection phase. This
implies that all defecting factions have the same power, as they experience an identical
increase in power during the defection period, and therefore must experience the same
decrease during the cooperation period.
This model maximises the time spent in a defection by restricting the first cooperation
event. Consequently, the leading faction has been reduced to the minimum power possible
and so the cooperation period starts from the fairest distribution of power possible. This
maximises the time spent in the cooperation phase.
Collapse occurs when faction N defects, and recovery occurs when faction N can
resume cooperation (as Pi(t) = PN (t) for all i ≥ 2). As (N − 1)PN (t) + P1(t) = 1, we
can describe the dynamics in terms of a single quantity PN (t). Let τc be the time for
collapse, τr be the time for recovery. Let PN (τc) = P
c
N be the power of faction N at the
collapse event, and PN (τr) = P
r
N be the power at the recovery event. The duration of
the cooperation phase is ta = τc and the duration of the defection phase is tb = τr − τc.
The condition for defection gives P cN = 1/N − w, and the condition for recovery
(from Equation S10) gives P rN =
1−wN
1+wN P
r
1 which (since power sums to 1) implies P
r
N =
5
1
N
1−wN
1−w(N−2) . During the cooperation phase (from time 0 to tc, duration ta)
dPi(t|C = N)
dt
= µ
(
Pi(t)− 1
N
)
=⇒ P cN =
1
N
+
(
P rN −
1
N
)
exp(µta) (S15)
leading to
ta =
1
µ
log
[
N
(
w +
1−Nw
2
)]
. (S16)
Similarly, during the defection phase (from time tc to tr, duration tb)
dPN (t|C = 1)
dt
= µ
1
N
w(ρ− 1)
=⇒ P rN = P cN + tbµ
1
N
w(ρ− 1) (S17)
leading to
tb =
1
µ(ρ− 1)
(N − 2)(1−Nw)
1− w(N − 2) . (S18)
This bound is extremely accurate when initial conditions are close to the assumptions
(i.e. factions 2 − N have equal power). Under some parameter and initial conditions,
the distribution of power tends towards this structure, in which case the bounds are
moderately close (but not exact due to intrinsic noise). If factions have a distribution
broad distribution of power in stationarity, then the bound is poor. A significant factor
is that defection and cooperation cascades do not occur instantaneously, and if multiple
factions retain power above 1/N then the cooperation cascade is structured differently.
S1.4 Informative reformulations
When all R0i = R
0 the resource defection penalty can trivially be written as a relative
reduction in resource, rather than a subtraction:
Ri(t|Di = 1) = R0 − w = aR0 (S19)
where a = 1 − w/R0. Similarly, the political gain for rebellion can be rewritten as a
relative rather than absolute gain:
Pi(t+ 1|Di = 1) = Pi(t) + ∆(t) µ
N
[Ri(t) + ρw] = Pi(t) + ∆(t)
µλ
N
Ri(t) (S20)
where λ = 1 + ρw/(R0 − w). This form makes it clear that power under both choices
are exponentially changing with different rates. The model has not changed under these
reformulations.
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S2 Model Extensions
S2.1 Unequal resource distribution
Most of the theory we have developed applies only to the case where all factions have
equal access to resources. When these differ, each will have a different decision boundary
and obey more complex dynamics (as e.g. when cooperating they will be diverging from
different points). Although the mathematical details do differ, the intuitive reasoning
remains the same: each faction has a decision boundary, and changes of decision will still
have a cumulative effect on other factions’ decision boundaries. Therefore (provided all
factions can actually afford to defect) the qualitative dynamics remain the same.
In Figure 3e we use a parametric model for the unfairness of the resource distribution,
parameterised by the inequality parameter κ:
R0j =
exp(κj)∑N
i=1 exp(κi)
(S21)
Figure S1 shows the structure of this model as the intrinsic resource available to factions,
and the initial conditions, are varied. When the initial distribution of power is correlated
with resource (Figure S1A), then the dynamics of the model are almost unchanged from
the uniform resource model. However, political leadership can be taken from the resource-
weak by a resource-strong faction (Figure S1B). It is possible for an faction to remain
leader when they only have a moderate resource (Figure S1C).
Since the most powerful faction is j = 1 and the most resource-rich faction for κ > 0
is j = N , there is a conflict between power and raw resource. Hence Figure 3e involves
a reversal of the capital for a wide range of κ. However, for smaller κ the reversal does
not occur and a resource-poor faction remains in power. Figure S1 illustrates how this
results in lowered overall conflict rate, because average inequality remains at a lower
level. When resource rich factions are in power (Figure S1AB, other factions much defect
frequently to maintain their position. When resource poor factions are in power (Figure
S1c), resource-rich factions do not need to defect much, and other resource-poor factions
are unaffected, resulting in a lower defection rate.
S2.2 Uncertain outcomes
Power has been modelled using deterministic dynamics conditional on the defection
choices. We relax this unrealistic assumption by allowing noise in the outcome of the
political power process. If we let ∆tPDi (t) be the deterministic prediction for the change
in power from Equation S2, then the power follows
Pi(t) = ∆tP
D
i (t) + ∆tN(0, σp), (S22)
which in the continuous time limit (cf Model 1a) can be seen as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
(OU) process. This process is ‘mean reverting’ to the deterministic solution but does
deviate on average by σp/2µ (by rescaling and taking the continuous limit).
The appropriate scale for the noise is the difference between the power of the factions.
From Section S1 this is O(1/N) so σp/2µ  1/N for the deterministic dynamics to
dominate. Figure 3f and Figure S2 support this. Noting that we used µ = 0.05 andN = 11
here leading to σp  0.009, the asymptotics have worked surprisingly well. Increasing
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A) Initial power correlated with raw resource
0.00 0.07 0.13
0 0.25 0.5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Base resource R0
Initial Power
0 200 400 600 800 1000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Time
Fa
ct
io
n 
ID
B) Initial power inversely correlated with raw resource
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C) Raw resource concentrated in factions 1−2
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Figure S1: Effect of changing raw resource levels. The left plot shows the defection
behaviour as in Figure 1C, and the right plot shows the initial power distribution (blue
line, top axis) and base resource level R0i (red line, bottom axis). Shown are A) τ = 0.1,
B) τ = −0.1, and C) initial power is distributed such that the highest resource factions
are not leaders.
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σp, leader replacement occurs first, then periodicity is lost, followed by infrequent state
formation and finally a failure to coordinate collapse events.
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Figure S2: Effect of changing the randomness in power outcomes σp. a) σp = 0.002, for
which leader replacement is rare but possible. b) σp = 0.005, for which periodicity has
been broken down but collapse events persist. c) σp = 0.008 for which noise is significant
and state formation is rare (but possible), and collapse events are poorly coordinated.
S2.3 Biased decision making and random choices
To generate an ‘imperfect decisoon model’ we replace the short-term resource optimising
decision rule for η with a random function taking the form
ηi(t; τ, σ, β) = Ri(t|Di = 1)−Ri(t|Di = 0) + β[2Di(t− 1)− 1] + σG(t; τ), (S23)
9
where β is the bias towards the previous choice. G ∼ GP(τ) is a Gaussian Process, which
is a random function with expected mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Specifically, for
a specified set of times t1 · · · tN , we define G(t1, · · · , tN ) ∼ MVN(0,K) i.e. multivariate
normally distributed with covariance matrix Ki,j = τ
2|ti − tj |2. One of the reasons to
use a Gaussian Process is that they defined for all times but only need to be evaluated
at the times where they are needed.
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a) β = 0.01
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b) β = 0.02
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c) β = 0.04
Figure S3: Behaviour of the Imperfect decision model with persistent choices, varying
β. a) Small β = 0.01 produces behaviour that is qualitatively the same as β = 0, with
a slightly longer period. b) Intermediate β = 0.02 allows leader turnover and increases
the period further. c) Large β = 0.04 prevents full scale collapse events but increases
the rate of collapse events, increasing the leader turnover rate. As before, w = 0.02,
ρ = 20,µ = 0.01 and N = 11.
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Figure S3 illustrates the effect that a tendency to keep the same decision (parame-
terised by β) has on the behaviour of the model. In general, it produces longer periods
of both defection and cooperation, as factions are reluctant to change. However, this has
the effect of forcing a more fair initial distribution of power in the forming state, which
permits the state to survive for still longer. Defections for a single faction have a defined
minimum length, since it takes a significant improvement of power to reverse a decision.
When β is moderate (Figure S3b), repeated defection can completely erode the leaders
resource benefit, resulting in leader turnover. For very large β (Figure S3c) the behaviour
of others does not affect choices very strongly compared to the desire to maintain the
previous action. In this case defection cascades are partially prevented.
The model with τ = 0 has independent Gaussian noise which is faster to simulate from.
The tendency not to change decisions can be easily be motivated from a psychological
perspective, or using internal politics if factions are groups of individuals. For example,
a faction leader may make a promise to cooperate or defect, which is difficult to reverse
without losing face. It can also be seen as risk aversion for the unknown effects of new
actions – factions may find it difficult to predict whether others will defect if they do.
Figure S4 demonstrates how the model breaks down in the presence of noise. Small σ
relative to the intrinsic power variability for non-leading factions has little effect on the
dynamics. However, as σ increases it becomes more likely that factions will defect during
stable cooperation. Moderate σ leads to a reduction in the length of collapse periods
(Figure S4b). High σ lets factions make choices ‘randomly’ (Figure S4c), which prevents
the possibility of state formation as no faction can remain in power.
However, correlated decisions can potentially permit cooperation in the presence of
very large decision noise. Figure S5a-b shows the behaviour in the intermediate noise case
with σ = 0.012. With τ = 5 (Figure S5a) cooperation periods have markedly increased
average cooperation levels from the τ = 0 case (Figure S4b), cooperation periods are
shorter and collapse times are less predictable. Increasing τ to 25 (Figure S5b) restores
the very clear distinction between cooperation and defection periods. This persists even
at high σ (Figure S5c), with the effect that leader turnover is now possible as factions may
refuse to cooperate for long enough to remove the leaders natural resource advantage.
The reason that highly correlated noise can support cooperation and defection periods
in our model is that each faction has a new equilibrium resource level that they will change
their action at (in the short term). If this changes more slowly than the internal political
dynamics, then they will change behaviour due to the effect of others rather than due to
their own random choices.
S2.4 Spatial structure
Some political scenarios are best described with a spatial model. For example, factions
may be local leaders of villages, or semi-autonomous regions of a larger state. Spatial
structure can be introduced via the relative advantage that cooperation confers. It is
natural that both the resource penalty for defection, and the political gains from doing
so, should depend on physical location. We can achieve this by replacing w by wi, which
is a function of distance from the political leader. Specifically, we allow an exponential
decay in the impacts of defection with distance:
wi = w
∗
0 exp (−|xi − xC |wd/N) (S24)
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c) σ = 0.015
Figure S4: Behaviour of the imperfect decision model with random choices, varying σ
but fixed τ = 0. In a) low noise levels lead to the same qualitative dynamics as in the
no-noise case, in b) medium noise levels reduce coordination of collapse, leading to less
define collapse events. In c) high noise levels prevent the construction of a permanent
‘state’, with turnover of the leading faction possible but state formation involving all
factions is not possible. As before, w = 0.02, ρ = 20,µ = 0.01 and N = 11.
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a) σ = 0.012, τ = 5
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b) σ = 0.012, τ = 25
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Figure S5: Behaviour of the imperfect decision model with random choices, varying σ
and decision correlation time τ 6= 0. a) and b) have σ comparable to Figure S4b,but vary
the decision correlation time τ ; c) is comparable with Figure S4c with large τ . As before,
w = 0.02, ρ = 20,µ = 0.01 and N = 11.
where w∗0 is a normalising factor to ensure the average effect is the same as the non-spatial
model, E(wi) = w, and wd is the spatial decay rate. When wd = 0 the model reduces to
the basic model. The factor N is included to account for the size of the system, as xi = i
is the spatial location of each faction (we consider them on a ring so that faction 1 is next
to faction N , to remove boundary effects).
The spatial model in Figure S6 allows for a variety of different scenarios. Interpreting
cooperation as a political state, this will grow from the ‘capital’ (the leading faction) and
will collapse as in the non-spatial model. Collapse may be from the outside-in (Figure S6b)
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a) wd = 0, β = 0.0
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b) wd = 0.5, β = 0.0
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c) wd = 0.5, β = 0.01
Figure S6: Behaviour of the spatial model (Model 3) with different values of the spatial
structure strength wd. a) wd = 0 and β = 0, for comparison. b) wd = 0.5 and β = 0. c)
wd = 0.5 and β = 0.01. As before, w = 0.02, ρ = 20 and N = 11, but we use µ = 0.005
for greater temporal resolution of the collapse events.
or the inside-out (Figure S6c). There may be a well defined maximum spatial extent. As
in the non-spatial model, the leader will remain stationary unless the tendency to repeat
the last action (β) is high enough. Because the change in power is highly dependent on
location, the duration of cooperation and defection periods changes drastically, but the
qualitative features of the non-spatial model remain.
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S2.5 Modified intrinsic noise
We chose to define the basic model as an iterated game. However, this has consequences
for the way that noise enters the system. There is nothing stochastic in the definition of the
model, but the discretisation of time can produce ‘chaotic’ dynamics as small variations in
the value of political power have large effects if they interact with the decision boundary
between defection and cooperation. Additionally, power changes relatively rapidly during
defection, which means that non-linear effects of the interaction of various states will
make the continuous time version of the model behave differently.
Intrinsic noise arises from the discrete nature of the choices and the times at which
those are made. If the power of state i changes by δPi(t) and it has a decision boundary
at P ∗i then there are a range of power values that lead to the same outcome of a change
in decision. Since power changes non-linearly, the particular values of power can get
out of phase, but can also be reset into phase during coordinated defection by changing
the order of cooperation. This can lead to semi-regular noise structures, such as that
observed in Figure 1. From Equation S3 the noise is of intrinsic magnitude O(µ/N) (with
situation-specific dependence on the other parameters).
There are three possible views of intrinsic noise:
1. Treat the underlying continuous-time, noise-free model as the model of interest
(Model 1a, described by Equation S3). Intrinsic noise is viewed as a numerical
integration error, and alternative numerical schemes could be considered.
2. Treat µ as a real parameter in the model, and treat the chaotic dynamics as a ‘real’
source of noise.
3. Consider alternative models that characterise the discretisation differently, and fo-
cus on properties of the system that are common to all models.
Although it would be interesting to study, we have not performed numerical integration.
This is because a) a somewhat specialist approach would be required to handle the choice
dynamics, and b) we do not believe that the noiseless version of the model is ‘closer to
reality’ than the discretised versions. We also don’t treat µ as an important parameter,
again because we believe that extrinsic noise will be present in real-world examples. We
instead focus on features that are robust to the level and type of intrinsic noise. To this
end we construct an additional variation of the basic model.
Model 1c: rather than updating all factions at every timestep, we increment time
by δt ∼ exp(1/N) (so that E(δt) = 1/N) and update a single, random faction. We
note that this takes the form of the Gillespie Algorithm and is appropriate if factions
are independently updating their decisions at rate 1. (Since the number of factions is
constant in our model, there is no interesting difference between this model and that
with δt = 1/N exactly). Time increments by 1 on average after N iterations of the new
timestep:
1. A random faction i can choose whether to cooperate (determining Di(t) from ηi(t)).
All other factions perform their previous action.
2. The actual resource obtained is evaluated.
3. The corresponding power changes are computed with Equation S2.
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This is slightly preferable to the original definition as we have removed one cause of
chaotic dynamics (the simultaneous decision problem). This prevents ‘alternating’ where
two sets of factions are exactly out of phase with one another (seen in Figure 1a).However,
this algorithm takes O(N) more computing power, contains an explicit form of noise, and
does not produce any qualitative difference in behaviour.
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A) Defection history for the game−theory model
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B) Defection history for the asynchronous decision model
Figure S7: The modified intrinsic noise model, comparing a) the standard synchronised
decision model, and b) the asynchronous decision model. Asynchronous decisions do not
change the qualitative periodic dynamics, but the period has changed slightly.
Figure S7 shows both the synchronous and asynchronous models, which display the
same overall features of periodicity formed by collapse/recovery cycles. The nature of
the intrinsic noise has changed; although the discretisation noise is O(N) smaller, there
is additional noise in the random decision order. This leads to a change how defection
occurs in the cooperation phase - it is more common, less coordinated, and (unlike the
synchronous case) does not involve the same ordering of factions. A consequence is that
both defection periods and cooperation periods are slightly shorter.
There is not a trivial reparameterisation that leads to the same periodicity. However,
a parameter mapping exists to retain the same periodic structure, and the models will
only be distinguishable by their fine-scale structure.
S2.6 Non-uniform defection penalty
We might believe that the magnitude of the penalty for defection should depend on the
number of cooperators, such that few defectors get a larger relative resource penalty than
16
when there are many defectors. This would also eliminate the somewhat artificial coop-
eration benefit enjoyed by the political leader even when there are no other cooperators.
Most reasonable models will make it easier for full cooperation and defection cycles to
occur. This is because defecting is more difficult when there are few defectors, and coop-
erating is more difficult when there are few cooperators. Provided that decision changes
are still possible for some achievable political power, then cycles will still occur and the
qualitative dynamics will be as the basic model. Hence we have focussed on the uniform
defection penalty model as it is the ‘hardest’ model we considered for producing collapse
events.
We substitute a variable resource penalty for w into the basic model:
wi(t|Si = 1, {Sj}) = Nw
N − 2
 ∑
j;Sj=0
R0j
−R0i
 = wN −D − 1
N − 2 . (S25)
Here, when ‘all defect’ (except the leader) D = N − 1 the penalty is wi = 0; when all
cooperate, the penalty for the first defection (with D = 1) is wi = w.
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B) Defection broken down by faction
Figure S8: Plot of the dynamics in the variable resource penalty model, with penalty for
defection proportional to the number of cooperators. A) shows the resource (red) and
power (green), whereas B) shows the defection history.
Figure S8 shows the behaviour of this model, which allows for leader turnover in a non-
trivial way. In simulations, we find that the first few factions (in initial political power) all
manage to lead cooperation phases, but that politically poor initial circumstances prevent
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ever becoming the leader. This dynamic occurs because the decision boundary during
defection phases has moved significantly higher. A defector considering joining a single
cooperator has a boundary with w replaced by w/(N − 2), and therefore the boundary
is an order of N closer to the leader’s. Intrinsic or extrinsic noise is much more likely to
lead to a replacement event. However, only factions who retain above-average power can
participate in this lead, as others are marginalised during the cooperation phase.
S2.7 Non-linear relationship between power and resource
Power changes might not scale linearly with resource. We can consider a modification
of Equation S2 in which power changes at some power of Ri (which can depend on the
defection status):
Pi(t+ 1|Di = 0) = Pi(t) + (µ/N)Ri(t)α −N (t)
Pi(t+ 1|Di = 1) = Pi(t) + (µ/N)[Ri(t) + ρw]β −N (t) (S26)
where α and β take values in (0,∞) and N (t) is redefined to maintain a total power of
1. A trivial examination of the continuous time limit of this model (as Model 1a) makes
it clear that this simply affects the rate at which power exponentially departs from 1/N
and therefore cannot have an important consequence for the modelling.
An additional model that might be considered allows resource to be non-linear in
power within the cooperators. This again cannot have an important impact as it only
changes the decision boundary, and can otherwise be written in terms of Model 1b with
β = 1 and α 6= 1.
S3 Qualitative indicators
Figure 3 quantified the match of our model to the qualitative data by use of four indicators.
Although crude, we have checked in all shown cases that these have matched our intuitive
understanding of how our model was intended to do. Here we expand more precisely on
these measures, which all take as input the second half of a long run (10000 time steps)
to ensure that we are observing the long-run behaviour.
1. ‘State formation’ (Sf ), measured by the proportion of time the number of conform-
ing or defecting factions is very high or very low. A condition for a ‘state’ in our
model is that it retains a high faction of the factions for a long duration. Specifi-
cally: we tabulate the number of timesteps the each number of factions (1, 2, · · · , N)
defects. These are split into quartiles Q1···4, accounting for the uneven number of
classes found in each quantile by allowing boundary cases to contribute to both
quartiles weighed to ensure that all quartiles would have the same value under a
uniform distribution. The score Sf = 2(Q1 +Q4).
2. ‘Periodicity’ (Sp), measured by how predictable conforming decisions are in T
timesteps. Specifically, we form the probability of a match t timesteps apart,
p(t) = (T − t)−1∑T−tt′=1 p(C(t′ + t) = c(t′)) for the number of conforming factions
C(t). We find the time difference τ = arg maxt p(t) for which p(t) is maximal (ex-
cluding the first mode at T = 0), and then report the height of the probability peak
as the score Sp = p(τ)− [p(τ/2) + p(3τ/2)] /2 (which should compare the height of
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the largest peak to the height of the ‘troughs’ each side of it). This produces sim-
ilar estimates of τ to the (more standard) autocorrelation function but in practice
resulted in slightly smoother estimates of τ and Sp.
3. ‘State size’ (Ss), scored as 1 if all factions have simultaneously cooperated and
simultaneously defected, 0.5 if they all simultaneously defected, and 0 otherwise.
This allows us to detect collapse either in full-sized, or smaller states.
4. ‘Capital stability’ (Sc) is 1 only if the leading faction does not change from the
initially most powerful faction, and Sc = 0 if it has done at any point in the history.
Score Match Deviate Fail
Sf > 0.5 NA ≤ 0.5
Sp > 0.05 ≤ 0.05 NA
Ss 1 0.5 0
Sc 1 0 NA
Table 2: How scores qualitatively match the data. For a simulation to be classified as
a ‘match’ all individual scores must match. To be classified as ‘deviation’ one or more
individuals scores must deviate and all others match. If any scores fail then the model is
classified as ‘fail’.
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